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Abstract 
Both the varieties of capitalism school (VOC) and regulation theory (RT) address the 
issue of how and why capitalisms differ. If VOC challenges the primacy of liberal mar-
ket economies (LME) and stresses the existence of an alternative form, i.e. coordi-
nated market economies (CME), RT starts from a long-term analysis of the transfor-
mation of capitalism in order to search for alternatives to the Fordist regime that 
emerged after the post-WW II era. Both approaches frequently use in-depth interna-
tional comparisons, challenge the role of the market as the exclusive coordinating 
mechanism, and raise doubts about the existence of ‘one best way’ for capitalism. Fi-
nally, they stress that globalization deepens the competitive advantage associated with 
each institutional architecture. Nevertheless, their methodology differs: VOC stresses 
private-firm governance, whereas RT considers the primacy of systemic and macro-
economic coherence. Whereas for VOC there exists only LME and CME, RT recur-
rently finds at least four brands of capitalism: market-led, meso-corporatist, social 
democratic and state-led. VOC seems to consider that the long-term stability of each 
form of capitalism can only be challenged by external shocks, but RT stresses the fact 
that the very success of a regulation mode ends up in a – largely endogenous – struc-
tural crisis. Whereas RT started from a rather economic point of view and now inves-
tigates the crucial role of politics, VOC originated largely in political science and po-
litical economy but now explores the economic theory of the firm. 
Zusammenfassung 
Sowohl die Lehre von der Diversität nationaler Kapitalismen (VOC) als auch die Re-
gulierungstheorie (RT) beschäftigen sich mit der Frage, wie Kapitalismen sich unter-
scheiden und warum sie es tun. Wenn die VOC die Vorrangstellung von freien 
Marktwirtschaften (LME) in Frage stellt und die Existenz einer Alternative, nämlich 
die der koordinierten Marktwirtschaften (CME) betont, so beginnt die RT mit einer 
Langzeituntersuchung der Transformation von Kapitalismen mit dem Ziel, Alterna-
tiven zum Fordismus der Zeit nach dem 2. Weltkrieg zu finden. Beide Ansätze ge-
brauchen häufig international vergleichende Detailanalysen, hinterfragen die Rolle des 
Marktes als exklusiven Koordinierungsmechanismus und zweifeln an der Existenz 
eines „one best way“ des Kapitalismus. Schließlich wird auf beiden Seiten betont, dass 
die Globalisierung den Wettbewerbsvorteil einer jeden institutionellen Architektur 
noch verbessert. Trotzdem ist die Methodologie unterschiedlich: Die Lehre von der 
Diversität nationaler Kapitalismen hebt die Governance der Privatwirtschaft hervor; 
für die Regulierungstheorie ist ihr die systemische und makroökonomische Kohärenz 
überlegen. Während die VOC sich ausschließlich auf LME und CME stützt, gibt es für 
die RT wenigstens vier verschiedene Arten von Kapitalismus: den marktgeführten, 
den mesokorporatistischen, den sozialdemokratischen und den staatlich kontrol-
lierten Kapitalismus. Für die VOC scheint die Langzeitstabilität aller Kapitalismen nur 
von externen Faktoren zu erschüttern sein; die RT legt Wert auf die Feststellung, dass 
der Erfolg einer Regulierungsmethode mit einer weitgehend endogenen Strukturkrise 
endet. Während die RT, von einem weitgehend ökonomischen Startpunkt ausgehend, 
nunmehr die entscheidende Rolle der Politik untersucht, setzt sich die weitgehend aus 
Politikwissenschaft und politischer Ökonomie stammende VOC heute mit wirtschaft-
lichen Unternehmenstheorien auseinander. 
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Introduction 
During the 1960s, comparative economic system analysts shared the vision that capi-
talist and socialist economies would finally converge towards a mixed economy com-
bining market mechanisms and state interventions. During the 1970s, few economists 
were concerned with the issue of capitalism, since most scholars preferred to deal with 
market economies and to concentrate more and more on specialised issues. Back in 
the 1980s, when Japanese economic performance seemed to challenge the American 
hegemony, American economists took some interest in analysing the difference be-
tween American and Japanese capitalism. Since the collapse of Soviet Union, another 
issue has emerged, prompting the question whether the diverse national economies 
will converge toward a single model or whether we should expect the coexistence/
competition between at least two variants of capitalism, namely, the Rhine model and 
the so-called Anglo-Saxon one. Similarly, the globalisation process and the financiali-
sation of economies have raised the same question about corporate governance: is not 
‘one best way’ bound to replace obsolete governance systems? 
This paper proposes to survey two parallel research programmes that precisely inves-
tigate these issues about the evolution and the diversity of contemporary capitalism. 
Actually, recent studies have revealed a remarkable convergence of two previously 
distinct research currents, one focusing on the many different forms of capitalism, 
and the other highlighting the diversity of modes of corporate organisation. A leading 
example is a book by Peter Hall and David Soskice, ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (2001), in 
which the authors set up a dichotomy between the neo-liberal and coordinated forms 
of market capitalism, offering two contrasting modalities of corporate organisation 
and of the search for competitiveness. 
The present text discusses this theory and compares it with another analysis about the 
relationship between the institutional forms of capitalism and the productive models 
firms have adopted. It is based on a conjunction of two research orientations. The first 
comes under the aegis of what is called Regulation Theory (RT), a school of thought 
that has tried to describe how institutional forms of capitalism have changed over 
time and the diversity of architectures that can be observed at any one point in time 
(Boyer/Saillard 2002). The second draws upon findings from a systematic comparison 
of the recent changes in the organisation of automobile firms (Boyer et al. 1998; 
Freyssenet et al. 1998; Durand et al. 1998; Lung et al. 1999; Boyer/Freyssenet 2002).  
The presentation will be organised in the following manner. It will first demonstrate 
how research into the transformation of capitalism’s institutions has actually had un-
expected effects – the long-term perseverance of a variety of forms of capitalism. A 
whole range of sectorial studies and of partial studies on the modern era has con-
firmed the hypothesis that at least four forms of capitalism coexist for OECD coun-
tries. We will then examine convergences (and divergences) amongst approaches that 
have been formulated in Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) terms. Since such approaches 
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ascribe capitalisms’ institutional diversity to two configurations marked by contrast-
ing forms of corporate organisation, they are an inducement to examine recent Regu-
lation Theory-inspired studies and to devise elements substantiating the institutional-
ist theory of firms and productive models. This is the goal of the third section of the 
paper, where we focus on hypotheses postulating institutional complementarity and 
isomorphism between organisations and institutions. 
Regulation Theory faced with the diversity of capitalism 
At the origin of this approach lies an analysis of the conditions that act ex post to en-
sure the viability of an accumulation process that, by its very nature, is subject to im-
balances, contradictions, and conflicts. Whereas traditional Marxist theory can only 
conceive of a single dynamic for this accumulation process, observations of the trends 
at work throughout the twentieth century have renewed the theorisation of capital-
ism. Clearly capitalism goes through sporadic periods of crisis, sometimes coming 
close to collapse (i.e., the U.S. economy from 1929 to 1932). But what has emerged 
from these episodes and from the social and political reactions they engender is a re-
configuration of competition and production relationships that has been so strong to 
have given birth to growth regimes which would have been impossible to predict back 
in the nineteenth century. For this reason, Regulation Theory first focused more on 
analysing capitalism’s stages than the variety of its forms at a particular moment in 
time. However, further research into the growth regimes that were likely to succeed 
Fordism, the system to have characterised the golden age of the postwar boom years, 
revealed the coexistence of many different forms of capitalism. Analysis subsequently 
carried on to cover modes of regulation and institutional architectures (see box on p. 
7). The present section offers a brief overview of this intellectual trajectory. 
The United States and France: identical growth regimes but different 
institutional architectures 
How can we explain the development that started in the late 1960s in which accumu-
lation tensions in the United States first manifested themselves through accelerated 
inflation before spawning a new type of crisis marked by the coexistence of inflation 
and lower activity levels? A long-term historical overview drawing from Marxist theo-
retical concepts offers one response. This new type of crisis evolved from a combina-
tion of collective agreements on wage increases and a general oligopolistic competi-
tion affected by capital concentration, on the one hand, and the use of monetary pol-
icy to manage credit in the hope of stabilising the accumulation process, on the other  
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The varieties of capitalism based on analysis of the modes of regulation 
Literature on the many different institutions and organisations that make up today’s economies often 
runs into a major hurdle with respect to the criteria we use to classify (and ultimately hierarchise) the 
configurations we observe. People often consider the growth rate, total factor productivity growth 
rate, employment rate or unemployment rate to be performance indicators that can be used to classify 
observations. However, since economic institutions also act to maintain the social contract as well as 
the stability lying at the heart of a given political order, there is nothing self-evident about basing a 
classification on purely economic variables. 
Without having explicitly chosen this focus from the very outset, regulationist research has de facto 
concentrated on homologies between economic adjustment processes. Towards this end it has used a 
concept entitled ‘mode of regulation’, a construct comprising all of the individual and collective proce-
dures and behaviours that reproduce basic social relationships, guide active growth regimes, and en-
sure the accounting of a myriad of decentralised decisions – without actors necessarily being aware of 
these system-wide adjustment principles (Boyer /Saillard 2002: 565). This definition invites us first to 
characterise growth regimes by setting up a dichotomy between the dynamics that govern how their 
productivity gains are obtained and how employees’ lifestyles are organised. The net effect is that at 
least four growth regimes have been identified (Boyer / Juillard 2002: 388). Fordism is only one of them 
and is defined here as an intensive regime focused on the mass consumption that emanates from 
wage-earners (Bertrand 1983). The number is greater than four if we consider social relationships other 
than the ones between capital and labour, one example being the rent relationship (Ominami 1986). 
What is essential, however, is what comes next, i.e., the characterisation of institutional forms aside 
from the wage–labour nexus, to wit, those forms that actually define the mode of regulation itself: 
form of competition; monetary regime; relationships between the state and the economy; and inser-
tion into the international system. For example, the competitive regime that dominated throughout 
the second half of the nineteenth century and in the interwar period spurred an intensive growth re-
gime that lacked in employee insertion, whereas Fordism was associated with a regulation described 
either as monopolistic or administrated, depending on whether emphasis was being placed on the ex 
ante quasi-accounting of supply and demand or on the institutionalisation of coordination procedures 
(Cepremap-Cordes 1977, 1978; Bénassy et al. 1979). This is somewhat reminiscent of the distinction that 
VOC makes for the modern era between neo-liberal market capitalism, on the one hand, and coordi-
nated market capitalism, on the other. However, the international comparisons that RT has inspired 
have led to an entirely different taxonomy of modern capitalisms. 
At first, the number of modes of regulation was inflated by a plethora of international comparative 
analyses, but then the number contracted as a result of criteria developed in theoretical studies (and 
followed up by observation). First of all, it is important that the adjustment process be endowed with 
stability over the short or medium term (Billaudot 1996, 2001), even when this property comes under 
pressure because of slow changes in the mode of regulation itself (Lordon 1996, 1997). Secondly, ob-
servations and classifications based on a whole set of shared criteria have shown that the different 
modes of regulation can be combined into a small number of configuration types (Amable et al. 1997). 
Why is it then that modes of regulation focus on a small number of configuration types, whereas RT 
stresses the political origins of institutional forms? The first reason is that social and political battles 
may be one source of institutional forms, but the imperatives of economic reproduction are what de-
cide which configurations are going to be viable, via a co-development process (Dosi 2002). A second 
reason may stem from the isomorphism between different institutional and organisational forms (Di-
Maggio /Powell 1991), depending on whether a market, meso-corporatist, social democratic or statist 
logic prevails (cf. Table 4 below). A third factor emphasised by recent research is a hierarchy (Boyer 
1993) or complementarity (Amable 1999, 2001, 2002) among institutional forms that has been found to 
exist during every major era. 
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(Aglietta 1976). This change in structural forms (viewed as a codification of basic so-
cial relationships) is what made it possible to set up an intensive mass consumption-
oriented growth regime – a.k.a. Fordism. This sort of characterisation is part of an 
analytical tradition that once focused on capitalism’s different stages. Of course, it 
runs counter to a sequencing going from competitive capitalism in the nineteenth 
century to monopolistic capitalism in the first half of the twentieth century and then 
monopolistic state capitalism (Tcheprakov 1969; Marx 1971). 
Was this change general or was it restricted to the United States, where, according 
to Marxist theory, capitalism was becoming what it had been in England during 
the previous century, to wit, the social laboratory from whence epochal innova-
tions should emerge (albeit without any uniform diffusion)? A historical study of 
French capitalism using the same methodology both confirmed this analysis and 
modified it subtly (Cepremap-Cordes 1977, 1978). Institutional, statistical, and 
econometric analyses confirmed a striking parallelism in the way growth regimes 
developed in France or the United States. The interwar period’s intensive accumu-
lation without mass consumption had caused the crisis of the 1930s in both coun-
tries. However, after the Second World War, changes in production and consump-
tion norms began to synchronize, a development that specifically led to the advent 
of Fordism. And yet, the architectures of institutional forms guiding this growth 
regime were not identical. Whereas market logic continued to play a crucial role in 
the United States, France was characterised by a great deal of institutionalisation, 
based on multiform state intervention. If we were to compare the two countries’ 
modes of regulation in detail, we would see that they were far from equivalent. 
This diagnosis is confirmed by comparing the paths the two countries followed 
during the crisis of Fordism. On one hand, a logic based on the premise of compe-
tition was reactivated in the United States, raising questions about the wage–
labour nexus’s preceding mode of institutionalisation, the moderation of inter-
firm competition, and the style of public intervention. In a sense, this was the re-
turn to a long tradition in American history (Aglietta 1986). On the other hand, in 
France a much more extensive codification of institutional forms initially helped 
to attenuate the brutality of the crisis, ultimately spreading its impact over time. 
Of course, this also meant that the state would centralise those reforms that be-
came necessary as the limitations of Fordism became apparent (Coriat 2002). In 
addition, these were reforms that turned out to be particularly difficult to manage 
in the 1980s and 1990s – one reason why the American and French forms of capi-
talism have diverged so much over the past twenty years. 
Retrospectively, the fact that two different institutional architectures – one domi-
nated by the market, the other by multiform state interventions (Boyer 1999) – 
could ‘pilot’ two growth regimes of the same ilk already raises questions about the 
institutional diversity of capitalism. By the by, this was also the first sign of a di-
chotomy between a market-dominated capitalism and one with a strong statist 
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impetus. Another lesson was that convergences and divergences are tied to a par-
ticular period in time but do not constitute a general feature, as proven by the 
comparison between United States and France. 
What if Fordism were the exception? 
It remains that this initial comparison does not fully exhaust questions about the di-
versity of capitalism’s institutions. Strengthened by the types of outcomes achieved by 
establishing Fordism in France and in the United States, regulationist research then 
tried to analyse whether the industrialised OECD economies were part of the same 
process. Clearly, mass production and mass consumption eventually dominated in 
most European countries (Boyer 1986b) as well as in Japan (Yamada 1992; Inoué/
Yamada 2002). Yet institutional forms were given a range of different codifications 
from one country to the next. This was particularly true with the wage–labour nexus. 
At first, it seemed possible to account for observed diversity by seeing it as something 
akin to minor variants of a canonical form of Fordism. For example, the belated refer-
ence to Fordism in Germany (not until the 1970s), plus the country’s accentuated 
polyvalence and more extensive employee rights led people to believe that the FRG 
was operating a flexi-Fordist rather than a typical form of mass production 
(Leithausser 1986). Similarly, Italy exemplified a strong heterogeneity in its wage–
labour nexus: in northern Italy, workers’ struggles resulted in a significant institution-
alisation of industrial relations, whereas in Third Italy the rules of the game were 
more implicit and quite different. Thus, it proved easier to make economic adjust-
ments there than in northern Italy (Wolleb 1986). Lastly, England provided a remark-
able counter-example by disproving the notion that supposedly superior forms of 
wage–labour nexus or productive organisation would automatically be successfully 
diffused – an example of hindered Fordism (Ward 1986). 
Add to this the many different studies on other countries, and people could no longer 
help but acknowledge that Fordism, when defined by a conjunction of three proper-
ties, was a feature found only in a few countries at best. These said properties were, 
first, a mainly intensive type of mechanisation-driven accumulation; second, a capi-
tal–labour compromise in which shared productivity gains were ensured; and third, a 
circuit of accumulation operating within the national space, without any undue con-
straint as a result of the international mode of insertion (Boyer 2002). Take the exam-
ple of Canada. Given its specialisation and dependency both on natural resources and 
commercial relations with the United States, Canada was at best a permeable type of 
Fordism (Jenson 1990) and in all likelihood followed an entirely different type of 
growth regime. Confirmation that the Fordist model per se was not what was actually 
being diffused should have come from applying this approach to the industrialising 
economies. The only theoreticians refusing to see this were ones hoping to renew our 
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understanding of international relations by stressing the position each country occu-
pies in the capital circuit organised under the aegis of Fordism (Lipietz 1985). Brazil, 
for example, did import mass production techniques. However, given the country’s 
uneven income distribution and the absence of contractual employment relationships 
in the corresponding industries, the hypothesis of a Fordism imposed upon a reluc-
tant society (Coriat/Saboia 1987) needed to be replaced by a much more structural 
and specific analysis of growth regimes in Latin American and Southeast Asian 
economies (Boyer 1994). 
Two other results also helped to relativise the generality of the Fordist growth regime. 
What became apparent when people wanted (prematurely) to apply a Fordism analy-
sis to economies other than those of the United States or France was that the macro-
economic interconnections (in terms of growth, productivity, and capital intensity) 
could be of a very different nature, for example, in the German and Japanese econo-
mies (Barou/Keizer 1984; Baslé/Mazier/Vidal 1984). Growth was export-driven in 
some of these economies, with competitiveness stemming from a price effect (or from 
quality and innovation) and wage bargaining first occurring in the export sector be-
fore spreading to the rest of the economy. All of these interconnections reversed the 
direction of the causality as postulated in a Fordist model that, ideally, would have 
liked to break free from international relations and the constraints they force upon 
domestic dynamics. Note that these are the economies that VOC describes as being 
coordinated, and where the social protection system mainly develops along the lines 
of a social-democratic national model. 
A second series of studies examined the characteristics of the wage–labour nexus’s 
development and rearrangement trajectories, seeing as this is the institutional form 
that played such a key role in the Fordist regime (Boyer 1991). The findings of these 
studies indicated that, even if the factors of change were widely shared (internationali-
sation, new wave of technological innovation, tight monetary policy, budgetary aus-
terity, reversal of political alliances), the effects varied since the modes of regulation 
and (as we have just seen) the modes of growth did not obey the same principles. Fur-
thermore, actors’ strategic choices varied from one country to the next. In this respect, 
the search for a post-Fordist regime was regularly frustrated since none of the ideal-
type models (return to competitive regulation, massive delocalisation of Fordist in-
dustries, search for cooperative regulation) was able to predominate, much less spread 
to economies throughout the world (Boyer/Durand 1993).  
Thus, not only could the modes of regulation differ for a particular kind of growth 
regime, but several such regimes relied on varying types of institutional architecture. 
This is how RT deals with the question concerning the diversity of capitalism – despite 
the fact that this issue was not part of its initial focus. Indeed, a broader perspective 
would show that the theme has played an increasing role over time (Table 1). 
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Table 1 The status of international comparisons in Regulation Theory 
Authors Research aims Implications for the 
unicity / diversity debate 
Conditions in which  
diversity persists 
Aglietta (1976) Explain the originality of the 
American crisis 
The U.S. is a laboratory for  
one theory of capitalism  
Insistence on endogenous 
changes in the modes of  
regulation 
Cepremap-Cordes 
(1977) 
Verify the hypothesis that 
Fordism constitutes the basis  
of France’s postwar growth 
regime  
The growth regime has strong 
analogies with the U.S. but the 
institutional forms vary 
Same form of economic  
regime but diversity of  
institutions supporting it 
Delorme / André 
(1983, 1989) 
Verify the hypothesis of an 
inclusive state 
Changes after the Second 
World War, to varying degrees 
depending on the country 
Expression of the idiosyncratic 
nature of ‘institutionalised 
compromises’ 
Barou / Keizer (1984);  
Baslé / Mazier / Vidal 
(1984) 
Analyse how the major  
economies changed during  
the 1970s crisis  
Macroeconomic trajectories  
are heterogeneous (growth,  
profits, inflation, unemploy-
ment) 
Insertion into international 
division of labour tends to 
enhance the persistence of 
regulation modes  
Boyer (1986a) Analyse the generality of the 
Fordist growth regime in 
Europe 
A lot of diversity in the forms 
of wage–labour nexus – hence 
in the modes of regulation 
Historical nature of  
work-related conflicts and 
institutionalisation of the 
wage–labour nexus  
Boyer (1991) Analyse the transformation of 
the wage–labour nexus in the 
OECD countries to detect post-
Fordist configurations  
No convergence towards a 
competitive or cooperative 
type of wage–labour nexus  
The institutional forms  
inherited from the past also 
condition the strategies of 
wage–labour nexus reform  
Boyer (1994) Characterise and compare 
growth regimes in developing 
countries  
Contrast between Latin  
America and Asia  
Specialisation-related differ-
ences (natural resources versus 
industry) and configuration of 
the wage–labour nexus 
Boyer (1996) Test the hypothesis of an 
economic and institutional 
convergence amongst OECD 
countries 
No general convergence trend, 
coexistence of at least three 
forms of capitalism 
Each model has its own specific 
innovative capabilities; efforts 
to strictly imitate the institu-
tions of other models fail 
Théret (1997) Compare national social pro-
tection systems 
Diversity is the rule, due to 
variable combination of  
responsibilities amongst firms, 
family, and state 
Permanence of different orders 
imbued with a modicum of 
autonomy  
Amable / Barré / Boyer 
(1997) 
Examine the relationships 
between the innovation  
system and the mode of  
regulation by comparing 12 
countries  
Confirmation of the coexis-
tence of four variants of  
capitalism: market, meso-
corporatist, statist, and social 
democratic  
Ordered internationalisation 
deepens specialisations relating 
to institutional endowments  
Boyer / Freyssenet 
(2002) 
Analyse the succession of 
productive models plus their 
relationships with growth 
regimes  
Durable coexistence of several 
productive models within one 
and the same institutional 
architecture 
Competition causes innovation, 
hence a renewed diversity of 
productive models  
Boyer (2001a) Seek institutions favourable to 
an ICT-driven growth regime  
Plurality of configurations: 
market capitalism, social  
democracy, an economy that 
plays catch-up  
Resistance against imitation 
and naive benchmarking  
Marques-Pereira /
Théret (2001) 
Compare two Latin American 
countries with two Asian  
countries 
Various links between eco-
nomic and political spheres, 
absence of geographic homo-
geneity  
System effects between a  
political and an economic  
regime; strategies open up 
during crisis periods  
Quémia (2001) Analyse the trajectories that 
Latin American countries have 
pursued since the 1970s  
Varied modes of regulations 
and types of crisis in Latin 
America  
Specialisation is inherited from 
the past; nature of political 
compromises and forms of the 
state  
Amable / Petit (2001) Analyse the distribution and 
development of social innova-
tion systems (SIS) 
Increasing number of SIS  
to at least six 
Classification’s sensitivity to 
criteria and indicators 
Strength and plurality of  
technological, strategic, and 
institutional complementarities 
Amable (2004) Update the previous analyses 
of SSI until the early 2000s 
Confirmation of the persisting 
diversity of capitalism 
Existence of complementarities 
and absence of mimetism in 
national economic policy 
Boyer (2004a, b) Find out the institutional 
configurations favourable  
to a knowledge economy 
At least three distinct  
configurations 
Path dependence of political 
compromises and related  
complementarities 
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The importance of politics in the diversity of capitalism 
Modern literature offers more and more explanations why capitalism’s organisations 
and institutions are so diverse. For example, the fact that information is imperfect 
means that people need to manipulate agreements, organisations, or even institutions 
helping them to overcome negative effects such as a lack of equilibrium, rationing, or 
unsatisfactory equilibriums (Stiglitz 1987). Yet there is a no such thing as a unique 
solution. Similarly, the existence of increasing returns and innovation-related ex-
ternalities opens up the possibility of multiple equilibriums and path dependency 
(Arthur 1994), this being a second major source for differentiating productive 
systems and therefore economies. As for evolutionist theories, they emphasise co-
development processes between technologies, institutions, and norms, leading to 
diverse trajectories that tend to diverge over time (Dosi 2002). From the very out-
set, regulationist research has stressed the role that political processes play in the 
genesis of institutional forms, as opposed to a technological kind of determinism. 
Analysis of French capitalism over the long run has demonstrated the crucial role 
of social conflicts and how such conflicts are transmitted via the political sphere – 
which in turn drives change in the legal framework (Cepremap-Cordes 1977, 
1978). At a very general level, institutional forms (to wit, the codification of basic 
social relationships) have been viewed as an intermediary between two forces, ar-
gues the French legal specialist who inspired the Grenoble school of regulation’s 
first studies (De Bernis 1977). This general hypothesis was largely corroborated in 
later research. If such a wide diversity of employment relationships can be found, 
it is because social conflicts have led to capital–labour compromises that will vary 
greatly from one country to the next. To use just one example, workers’ struggles 
in the United States and France may have concerned increasing real wages and the 
recognition of certain social rights, but in Japan what emerged from labour con-
flicts were compromises about the promise of stable employment (Boyer 1991; 
Orléan 1991). 
In much the same way, the concept of institutionalised compromise that was devel-
oped to account for changes in French taxation, public spending, and regulatory envi-
ronments (Delorme/André 1983) demonstrated the relative contingency of forms of 
public intervention. Above and beyond the state’s growing role in the economy and in 
society, public spending and taxation trends were strongly affected by a succession of 
political struggles unfolding within the nation-state (André/Delorme 1989). The 
building of national social protection systems (NSPS) touched upon the same kinds of 
processes: the nature of the risks being covered; the organisation of the services on 
offer; the modalities of funding – all characteristics that were highly affected by past 
social and political conflicts. In actual fact, observations derived from international 
comparisons confirmed the extreme diversity of NSPS, with respect to their organisa-
tion, quantitative size, or generosity (Théret 1997). Despite pressure to reform such 
systems, they were far from standardised (André 1997). 
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Given the scale of public interventions and the role they played in configuring the 
incentives and constraints with which economic agents have to cope, it is easy to see 
how the different forms of capitalism have continued to manifest configurations that 
are much more diverse in nature than is suggested in the naive vision of globalisation 
as something akin to a convergence with a canonical form of capitalism (Berger/Dore 
1996; Boyer 1999). Still, it is questionable whether it is the specificity of the institu-
tionalised compromises coming out of the political sphere that has caused this prolif-
eration of different forms of capitalism, with each entity having ultimately become 
idiosyncratic in nature. Two reasons at least have attenuated this danger. On one 
hand, from a strictly empirical point of view, the taxonomies that people have come 
up with are largely convergent. On the other, a priori the emphasis on the macroeco-
nomic properties of growth regimes limits the number of configurations that can be 
viable over the medium term. These are the two themes that permeate regulationist 
research, which has moved closer to the objectives of VOC-oriented approaches. 
Concordant typologies: evidence of various institutional complementarities? 
Should we conclude that there are as many forms of capitalism as there are nation-
states? Of course, an increasing number of international comparisons in a variety of 
fields (employment relationship, relations between state and economy, social protec-
tion, innovation systems) have revealed remarkable convergence on just a few con-
figurations. This outcome is all the more noteworthy since these studies were under-
taken independently and pursued the specific analytical aims of the corresponding 
subsystems without necessarily purporting to deliver an overall analysis. Grosso modo, 
we find at least four forms of capitalism (Boyer 1996; Amable et al. 1997). The first 
puts its faith in the markets and in the independent authorities who are responsible 
for staving off market excess and the opportunistic behaviour it can generate. The 
second corresponds to a modernised version of the paternalistic capitalism that was so 
typical of the nineteenth century, in an environment where capital concentration led 
to the emergence of large conglomerate firms. The third emphasises the role of social 
partners in the emergence and management of most institutional forms, at the fore-
front of which is the wage–labour nexus (including the social protection system). The 
fourth involves a state-driven capitalism revolving around the crucial role played by 
national, regional, or local state authorities in making economic adjustments. 
All of this raises an interesting theoretical problem. As we know, each mode of regula-
tion is based on a conjunction of five institutional forms: the wage–labour nexus; 
forms of competition; the monetary regime; relational configurations between the 
state and the economy; and the modalities by which the economy is inserted into the 
international relations system. By merely combining these institutional forms, we 
already come up with 2 to the power of 5 (25 i.e., 32 different) variations, even if we 
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adopt the simplistic hypothesis that each can only assume two extreme configurations 
(Amable 1999; Amable et al. 2001). But this would mean that configurations are all 
equally viable. Inversely, if we were to postulate that, in the long run, something 
equivalent to an optimisation principle reigns over changes in the various forms of 
capitalism, only one of these configurations should be observable in the end. An in-
termediary position would envision a selection or imitation mechanism like the one 
that evolutionist theories have been formalising with regard to the technological 
choices firms make, thus enabling a long-term observation of several different trajec-
tories. 
Given the findings available to us, the first hypotheses do not seem to correspond to 
observations since more than two configurations (albeit no great number) have 
emerged from this confrontation between different areas and methods of analysis. It is 
within this framework that the concept of institutional complementarity shows its 
true power (Amable 1999; Aoki 2001). This concept is not unrelated to the theory of 
supermodularity that was put forward in an attempt to account for the coexistence of 
several productive models and the difficulty of adopting a new model, even one that is 
superior (Milgrom/Roberts 1990). Does this mean that the RT programme is nothing 
more than an analysis of the diversity of capitalism, hence a mere extension of the 
central VOC thesis (presented in the section below)? A second glance at Table 1 sug-
gests that RT’s aims have changed through time and are now much more extensive. 
Various institutional configurations imply different economic adjustments 
In fact, the RT project continues to enhance the understanding of the evolution of 
contemporary forms of capitalism and simultaneously to address the issue of their 
persisting diversity. The danger would be to adopt a pure empiricist method according 
to which each national or regional capitalism defines per se a typical configuration. 
Generally, RT considers that two capitalisms belong to the same category if they dis-
play the same style in macroeconomic adjustments, i.e. that they share the same ‘regu-
lation mode’ and accumulation regime. Therefore, two institutional configurations 
define the same brand of capitalism if they generate the same economic adjustment 
process. Over the past few years, the central theoretical question has been whether it is 
possible to develop a synthetic model that can encompass several different regimes 
and explain most, if not all, of the growth regimes on which long-term historical stud-
ies and international comparisons focus. 
An initial canonical distinction relates to the speed of technical change, captured by the 
rate of productivity increases and the methods by which they are obtained (labour 
saving investment, increasing return to scale …). Thus, intensive accumulation re-
gimes are the opposite of extensive ones (Boyer 1988). A second criterion concerns the 
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nature of demand: is it related to consumption or investment? This second distinction 
juxtaposes wage-led and profit-led demand regimes (Bowles/Boyer 1990). Therefore, 
Fordism is reinterpreted once again as an intensive accumulation regime associated 
with a wage-led demand, within the context of a low degree of internationalisation. 
A third criterion reintroduces forms of internationalisation as an important character-
istic for growth regimes. Depending on whether competitiveness derives from a price 
effect or from a quality or innovation-based differentiation, growth regimes differ 
from one another. This is especially important in order to understand how social de-
mocratic capitalisms operate: basically, they are small open economies with densely 
organised cooperation that display an export-led growth regime, in which competi-
tiveness is derived from institutional advantages typical of high levels of education, a 
highly competent workforce, and dynamic innovation.  
Lastly, many recent studies have tried to introduce finance as another factor shaping 
growth regimes (Aglietta/Mendelek 1987). Others have questioned the degree of nov-
elty associated with information technologies and its ability to create a new growth 
regime (Boyer 2001a). In both cases, it has become apparent that these potential re-
gimes are not free of contradiction, and above all, that they have had little opportunity 
to spread to all economies merely by assuming a canonical form of institutional con-
figurations. 
Thus, the diversity of contemporary forms of capitalism is not simply the outcome of 
the international comparison of institutional configurations; it is also evidenced by 
the building of macroeconomic growth models that try to make explicit the corre-
spondence between a set of institutional forms and economic adjustments. 
An even larger diversity for emerging economies 
Frequently, economic theoreticians consider that emerging economies are imperfect 
forms of a canonical brand of capitalism, featuring pure competition, i.e. a liberal 
market economy. On the contrary, institutionalists argue that each national economy 
has a specific institutional competitive advantage that clearly distinguishes this econ-
omy from others. In this respect, VOC and RT share the hypothesis that similar 
economies in developed and developing countries display complementary specialisa-
tion much more than they do typical unadulterated competition. This is one reason 
we find genuinely new brands of capitalism outside the OECD, the area usually under 
study in the literature on the varieties of capitalism and regulation theory. 
There is a second source of differentiation that relates to the characteristics of growth 
regimes in developing countries. One way of reintegrating the issue of underdevelop-
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ment is to examine the respective merits of strategies like import substitution and 
export-led growth (Boyer 1994, 2001b). Another source of differentiation is related to 
those of competitiveness in the exporting sector: on one side, some countries may 
emphasise low production costs associated with flexible labour markets, whereas 
other countries, especially the oil-producing ones, exploit their natural resources 
(Hausman 1981). It is easy to understand that these contrasted growth regimes are 
associated with quite different institutional forms. Thus, when the scope of compari-
son extends from the United States to Europe, then to Latin America (Quémia 2001; 
Marques-Pereira/Théret 2001) and even to Asia (Boyer/Yamada 2000), RT does not 
necessarily run the risk of simply characterising capitalisms on the basis of their geo-
graphic embeddedness. The observed differences in economic adjustments can be 
related to a precise set of alternative models. 
There is a third and quite important reason for the extension of the number of capi-
talisms: most institutional forms are the outcome of social and political struggles that 
potentially create unprecedented forms of coordination. For instance, state interven-
tions such as tax codes or the structure of public spending result from political com-
promise among various political groups. It is why state interventions are so diverse 
across the world. Similarly, the configuration of the wage nexus is deeply rooted in the 
Table 2 Latin American countries: a large diversity in ‘regulation modes’ and  
accumulation regimes 
1990s Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Venezuela 
Regulation 
mode 
 
Largely market-
led and open 
to world com-
petition 
Between  
clientelist and 
market-led  
Moderately 
market-led 
Corporatist in 
crisis 
Administered 
and ‘rentier’ in 
crisis 
Leading institu-
tional forms 
Monetary 
regime and 
forms of com-
petition  
Basic but de-
clining role of 
the state 
Central role of 
the state 
Monetary 
regime and 
free trade 
agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Leading role of 
state, but de-
clining effi-
ciency 
Complementary 
institutional 
forms 
Highly flexible 
wage–labour 
nexus 
Very flexible 
wage–labour 
nexus 
Accommodat-
ing exchange 
and monetary 
regime 
Accommodat-
ing wage–
labour nexus 
Accommodat-
ing monetary 
policy 
Accumulation 
regime 
Intensive and 
competitive-
ness-led 
Intensive with 
de-structuring 
of productive 
coherence 
Extensive and 
‘rentier’ with 
diversification 
Dual: export-
led in the 
north, inward 
looking else-
where  
Rentier 
Performance High but un-
balanced pro-
ductivity in-
creases 
High productiv-
ity increases, 
uncertain 
growth 
Few productiv-
ity increases 
Productivity 
increases in 
modern sectors 
No significant 
productivity 
increases 
Nature of crisis Structural crisis: 
bank insol-
vency, panic 
devaluation, 
political insta-
bility 
Loss of coher-
ence of the 
productive 
systems and 
slow growth 
Intrinsic limits 
of extensive 
accumulation 
Legitimacy 
crisis that spills 
over on exter-
nal viability 
Structural crisis 
during the 
1990s 
Source: Quémia (2001). 
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history of work and labour in each country. Given the importance of this institutional 
form, it is not a surprise to observe the large diversity of labour market adjustments. 
They differ between Latin American countries and Asian countries (Boyer 1994), as 
well as between Western and Eastern Europe, not to speak of the domination of in-
formal labour in most African countries. Last but not least, the way a national econ-
omy is inserted into the international system is largely a matter of political choice and 
not simply the legacy of the insertion into the international division of labour (Omi-
nami 1986). 
When all these factors are combined, it is not astonishing to find that developing 
countries exhibit quite original forms of capitalism. This is especially so within Latin 
American countries (Table 2). The abovementioned arguments would be strength-
ened by once again including the East European countries that have moved out of a 
Soviet political and economic regime or by adding China (or even India). Of course, 
internationalisation disturbs the coherence of various capitalisms, but at the same 
time it allows the emergence of new forms (see the section on the endogenous evolu-
tion of each form of capitalism, below).  
Taking the methodological requirements of international comparison seriously 
An initial delineation of the RT vs. VOC debate can revolve around the fact that in-
depth research has led to a rejection of the hypothesis wherein economies should be 
analysed in terms of a canonical model. It needs to be remembered that the discovery 
of Fordism as a principle for explaining American and French growth initially gave 
birth to the first generation of international comparisons that tried to measure the 
distances (or the modalities of minor adaptations) between these models and some 
canonical configuration: hindered Fordism in Great Britain, flexi-Fordism in Ger-
many (Boyer 1986b), permeable Fordism in Canada (Jenson 1990), imposed Fordism 
in a very reluctant Brazil (Coriat/Saboia 1987), not to mention the devastating oxy-
moron that was the pseudo-concept of peripheral Fordism (Lipietz 1985). 
Comprehensive comparisons should show that these are caricatures of the aforemen-
tioned countries’ growth regimes and modes of regulation, derived from specific insti-
tutional architectures that should be given a name of their own, without reference to 
some reputedly perfect external model. Either implicitly or explicitly, recent VOC 
research (Hall/Soskice 2001; Gourevitch/Hawes 2001) use neo-liberal market 
economies (NLME) as a benchmark configuration against which only one other dia-
metrically opposed form can possibly be contrasted, to wit a coordinated market 
economy. Before returning to a comparison of proposed typologies, let us first focus 
on a few methodological issues (Table 3). 
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The first issue is that real international comparison can only begin when people stop 
comparing economies two-by-two and, to the contrary, acquire the means to under-
take multipolar comparisons. This infers an approach and a range of concepts that are 
equidistant from each of the entities being analysed. This criticism is particularly 
poignant seeing as pundits have frequently taken to comparing each economy with 
the U.S. economy since the 1990s. To cite just one example, literature often pushes the 
idea that the Japanese economy suffered a crisis in the 1990s because it was unable to 
adapt the institutions of American capitalism. The same diagnosis was reiterated for 
Europe, which was said to be lacking in venture capitalists and in the new markets 
capable of bringing it into line with the information economy. However, the same 
criticism can be applied to comparisons that are ostensibly multinational yet try in 
fact to break country samples down into two subsets, one corresponding to econo-
mists’ traditional conception and the other much more atypical in nature (Hall/
Table 3 The methodology underlying international comparisons: an assessment of how 
they impact analyses of the different 
 Characteristics 
Methods Aims Advantages / merits Shortcomings / limitations 
1. Benchmarking 
 Ex: OECD (2001) 
Assess each entity’s variance 
versus a referent, here the 
capitalism said to have 
performed best at the time 
Simplicity 
Homology with company 
executives’ practices 
Implied normativity 
Inaccurate assimilation of 
national economy with a firm
Neglects coherency of alter-
native forms of capitalism 
2. Classification based on 
data analysis of a whole 
set of characteristic  
indicators 
 Ex: Amable / Barré / Boyer 
(1997); Amable / Petit 
(2001) 
Reveal oppositions and  
proximities with a popula-
tion of national economies 
Open method in terms of 
nature and number of  
configurations 
Entities are treated  
symmetrically 
Relatively arbitrary choice of 
items and indicators 
Potential instability of  
classifications 
Limits of a purely inductive 
method: which mechanisms? 
3. Structural method 
 Ex: Théret (1997) 
Explain elementary  
components and examine  
the compatibility of  
combinations 
Heuristic virtue: defines an 
ideal-type 
Theoretical analysis of  
coherent configurations and 
comparison with what is 
observed 
A certain proliferation of 
configurations 
Methodological difficulty 
relating to the distinction 
between harmonic or dys-
harmonic configurations  
4. Modelling of strategy used 
by firms operating in given 
institutional context 
 Ex: Mares (2001); 
Amable / Ernst / Palom-
barini (2001) 
Ensure microeconomic  
viability of an institutional 
ensemble 
Clarity of mechanisms  
ensuring regime’s viability  
Might be compared with 
what is observed 
Ability to generate potential 
modes of regulation 
Necessary simplification of 
existing procedures 
Complexity of the models 
formalising a plurality of 
complementarities  
5. Qualitative analysis 
method 
 Ex: Kogut / MacDuffie /
Ragin (2002); 
Boyer (2001a) 
Explain conjunction of at-
tributes to ensure a given 
outcome (growth, equality, 
democracy) 
Open to nature and number 
of possible configurations 
Compatible with limited 
number of observations 
Sensitivity to operational 
processing 
Apparent loss of information 
regarding quantitative data 
6. Econometric analyses 
(segments / series) incl.  
institutional variables and 
their combinations  
 Ex: Ernst (2001); 
Hall / Gingerich (2002) 
Test the impact of certain 
institutions on performance 
(unemployment, growth, 
productivity) 
Quantitative basis for  
assessing institutions’ impact 
Reveals institutional com-
plementarities thanks to 
estimation of crossed terms 
In actual fact, a single regime 
is being postulated here 
Fragility of findings 
Hard to interpret findings 
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Soskice 2001: 19, 22). Although data analysis has not spontaneously produced this 
dichotomy, it would seem to be a good method to rely on a U-shaped curve, i.e., a 
non-linear relationship between a performance indicator and a measurement of the 
position each economy has taken on a single axis, usually defined by the intensity of 
its market mechanisms (Hall/Gingerich 2002: 37). Still, this subterfuge is far from 
convincing, since it actually hides at least one intermediary configuration between the 
two polar extremes that are emphasised in modern VOC research. 
Yet in theory nothing guarantees that a single axis of description (i.e., one with a mar-
ket vs. state juxtaposition or a company vs. market or market vs. civil society distinc-
tion) suffices to describe the constellation of capitalisms – hence the need for a multi-
faceted approach (see Figure 2 below). 
A more deductive and theoretical method introduces a second reason to broaden the 
conceptual framework surrounding international comparisons. Loyal to its origins in 
essence, RT has recently revived the structuralist approach that seeks to find the con-
ditions under which it is possible to combine the various breakdowns of each institu-
tional form or, more generally, the components of a social organisation (Théret 1997). 
Here the entire problem is to overcome a simple combination of institutional forms 
by explaining the theoretical reasons why they could be antagonistic, complementary, 
or independent. The reference to an institutional hierarchy plus the confrontation 
with a few significant findings from international comparisons distinguish this struc-
tural method from a purely combinatory approach. 
This strategy is particularly useful in analysing, for example, national social protection 
systems (NSPS) that have been defined by the intensity of the relationships in three 
different spheres: economic, political, and domestic. It seems that the attempt to cre-
ate a dichotomous observation falls apart here since a combinatory approach, con-
firmed through observation, reveals eight potential configurations that express com-
plex determinants like the ones associated with NSPS. On the one hand, this general-
ises and clarifies the plethora of taxonomies (Esping-Andersen 1990). On the other, it 
is no longer enough to merely dichotomise NLME and CME, and this relativises the 
aforementioned canonical polarisation. 
A third approach tries to overcome the illusion that there is such a thing as a strong 
complementarity, whereby the only reasonable description for Germany is as the flag-
bearer of CME, and for the United States as the Promised Land of NLME. How can 
we be sure that the sum total of institutions characterising the financial system, indus-
trial relations, the education and training systems, companies’ organisation, and spe-
cialisation will ultimately form a logically coherent system – or that this constellation 
is not simply the expression of a historical co-development process with certain com-
ponents that might one day turn out not to be particularly necessary to the mode of 
regulation’s viability? It is specifically through modelling that we are able to surmount 
this problem, this being a freqently used approach in both RT (Amable et al. 2001; 
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Gatti 2000; Ernst 2001) and VOC (Iversen/Soskice 2000). Still, the rigorousness of 
this deduction is associated with the relative fragility of the technical ancillary hy-
potheses that must be accepted if we want to devise formal outcomes. For the mo-
ment, we are unable to verify this complementarity for more than two institutional 
forms, given the increasing complexity of the formalisations used. 
Ideally, an approach formulated in terms of a statistical analysis of the distribution of 
capitalisms, a structural topology, and a modelling of the impact of institutions on the 
organisational choices made by firms should lead to a convergent diagnostic. Yet this 
has been far from the case in currently available studies, despite their already signifi-
cant consequences. 
Why only two forms of capitalism?  
In all likelihood this is one of the major differences between VOC and RT. Basically, a 
major objective of Peter Hall and David Soskice is to show that liberal capitalism is 
not the only, nor the most efficient configuration. Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, 
they agree to dichotomise the distribution of the various forms of capitalism (Ta-
ble 4). From a regulationist perspective, it is difficult to accept that the dichotomy of 
two polarised models can account for an entire distribution of modern economies. 
The first reason is empirical by nature since it is difficult to get all countries to fit into 
these two polarised models, even given the data collected by VOC’s proponents. It 
frequently arises in analyses that Japan bubbles out of one side of the pot and the 
countries of Southern Europe out of the other (Hall/Soskice 2001: i.e., 22). Authors 
are then tempted to interpret the observable phenomena as minor variants of NLME 
or CME or else as intermediary configurations.  
The strategy of RT is to leave open the number of configurations that has to result 
from the comparison of qualitative and quantitative methods and various research 
strategies, ranking from automatic data clustering to macroeconomic modelling. 
These methods allow us to successively order social systems of innovation and pro-
duction (SSIP), institutional architectures, modes of regulation and finally types of 
specialisation. All studies (Boyer 1991, 1995; Amable et al. 1997; Théret 1997; Boyer 
2004) have converged to reveal at least four configurations (Table 5). 
– A market-oriented capitalism in which commercial logic, adapted by the compe-
tition supervision entities, constitutes the main organising principle for almost 
all coordination procedures. In this group we find all of the English-speaking 
countries plus Norway sometimes (Amable/Petit 2001). 
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– Meso-corporatist capitalism’s driving principle is the exchange of solidarity 
against mobility in a conglomerate type of economic unit that is big and diversi-
fied enough to survive temporary booms and busts. Japan and Korea are two ex-
amples of this configuration.  
– A strongly state-driven capitalism is characterised by an economic circuit where 
most of the components (innovation, production, demand, industrial relation-
ships, credit, etc.) are moulded by a myriad of public interventions occurring at 
a national, regional, or local level. This configuration is typical of the continental 
countries taking part in the European integration drive. 
– Lastly, social democratic capitalism based on frequent negotiations between so-
cial partners and public authorities concerning the rules governing most of the 
components of social life and economic activity. The Scandinavian countries are 
flag-bearers for this model. 
Table 4 The difference between coordinated and liberal market economies  
according to VOC 
 Liberal capitalism Coordinated capitalism 
Education and training Investment in general skills Specific human capital in defined  
industries or firms 
Labour market  
institutions 
Deregulated markets, flexible  
reward-setting 
Employee cooperation and wage  
moderation 
Finance Monitoring by public information 
and venture capitalists 
Monitoring by banks via long-term  
ties with firms 
Competition policy Strong competition policy Intercompany relations allow  
cooperation 
In a sense, this generalised classification features a dichotomy between NLME and 
CME, but here the two other forms are more than simple intermediaries between 
market-oriented and ex-market coordination, seeing as they are based both on origi-
nal principles whose purpose is to smooth out economic imbalances and on methods 
for overcoming social conflict. For example, we find the same complementarity with 
respect to the innovation system that we do in the United States (Hall/Soskice 
2001: 42–43), but now the notion that competitive advantage stems from one’s insti-
tutional endowment has been extended to statist and social democratic capitalism, 
each deploying an economic specialisation that differs from its two predecessors (Ta-
ble 3, last line). VOC seems to prefer parsimony to the detriment of precision or extra 
relevancy, whereas RT prefers the other way around – raising questions as to whether 
we are dealing here with an institutional environment or with a research strategy. 
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Table 5 The diverse nature of capitalism in Regulation Theory 
Regulation 
Market-oriented Meso-corporatist Statist Social-democratic 
(1) Overall logic and hierarchical principle 
Commercial logic is the 
organising principle for 
almost all of the institutional 
forms 
Principle of solidarity and 
mobility in an economic unit 
that is large in size and 
diverse in terms of output 
Economic circuit shaped by 
public interventions in areas 
like production, demand, 
and institutional codifica-
tions 
Social partners negotiate the 
rules governing most aspects 
of society and the economy 
 (2) Implications for institutional forms 
Wage–labour nexus 
Significant decentralisation 
of wage bargaining,  
individualisation of pay and 
segmentation of labour 
market 
Wage compromise within 
large companies but pay 
hikes are synchronised 
Trend towards a strong 
institutionalisation of rules 
on employment, working 
hours, wages, and social 
benefits 
Traditionally with a  
centralisation of collective 
negotiations, under a  
constraint of short and  
medium-term competitiveness
Competition 
Concentration restricted by 
legislation, reshuffling from 
one oligopolistic type of 
competition to another 
Relatively intense in the 
product markets, involving 
big companies with activities 
in many different markets 
Moderate seeing as it is 
channelled by public  
regulations or by  
professional associations, 
with high degree of capital 
concentration 
Small number of big firms 
(that are also highly  
internationalised and thus 
have to compete) 
Money and finance 
Central bank is independent, 
financial market logic  
prevails, financial  
innovations proliferate, 
companies are tightly run  
by a financial logic 
Role of main bank and kei-
retsu in funding and capital 
allocation. State authorities 
(financial supervisors / Central 
Bank) have tight control  
State has tight control over 
credit and monetary policies. 
Traditionally the Central 
Bank has had little autonomy 
to speak of, the financial 
sphere having played a 
crucial role 
Most funding is by the  
banking sector. Monetary 
policy aims to enhance  
employment and at a later 
date competitiveness  
The state 
Fragmented into series of 
agencies and control entities, 
growth possibilities are 
highly restricted because of 
competition in the political 
marketplace 
Ensures provision of collec-
tive services and coordination 
measures that the big firms 
are incapable of running. 
Small size but significant role
Strong quantitative and 
qualitative development of 
state interventions:  
nationalised companies, 
regulations, public spending, 
social benefits, etc.  
Multitude of public  
interventions leads to  
financial transfers and  
extensive and restrictive 
regulations  
Insertion into international system 
Adhesion to free trade  
principles, degree of  
autonomy varies depending 
on status and size  
(differences US vs. UK) 
Trade and finance-related 
choices are conditioned by 
the imperative of  
technological and economic 
development 
Traditionally with a tight 
state control over external 
relations (tariffs, norms, 
quotas, restrictions on finan-
cial flows) 
Acceptance of  
competitiveness principle 
based on technological and 
organisational innovation  
(3) Characteristics of the mode of regulation 
Regulation very market-
oriented, controlled by 
sophisticated legal  
mechanisms  
Large companies, the mar-
ket, and the state make 
adjustments at the  
meso-economic level  
State at heart of macroeco-
nomic adjustments, with 
markets and firms adapting 
to its rules 
Tripartite bargaining  
(employers–unions–state) lies 
at the heart of institutional 
reforms 
(4) Effects on: 
Innovation 
Schumpeterian waves  
predicated on radical  
innovation, preponderance 
of a patent-based logic and 
individualisation of benefits 
derived from innovation  
Aptitude to copy and adapt 
products and processes by 
operating incremental yet 
profitable innovations  
Radical innovation supposing 
major investments and a 
long-term time frame.  
Adaptation of Fordist (i.e. 
relatively centralised)  
innovations 
Innovations are focused on 
resolving social and economic 
problems, be they marginal or 
radical 
Specialisation 
Sectors tied to radical  
innovation: IT, space,  
pharmaceutical, financial 
and leisure industries 
Sectors requiring major 
coordination efforts and 
mobilising a localised but 
cumulative type of  
competency: auto,  
electronics, robotics 
Sectors involved in major 
public infrastructures:  
transportation, telecom, 
aeronautics, space, arms 
industries, among others 
Sectors tied to social  
demand (health, security, 
environment. etc.) or that 
exploit natural resources 
through technological 
recovery 
Source: Amable /Barré /Boyer (1997: 194–195). 
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A variety of institutional arrangements based on contrasting logics 
The empirical argument would not be so crucial if it were not associated with a theo-
retical reasoning: by creating a dichotomy between a neo-liberal order and a coordi-
nated economy, VOC has dramatically simplified the different market logics and the 
multiplicity of institutional arrangements. On one hand, from a strictly semantic 
point of view, we should not forget that markets are capable of ensuring an entirely 
efficient coordination as long as they can be fully instituted and if the size of their 
scale returns and quality-based differentiation can be used to verify the extent of their 
viability (White 1981, 1988). This process requires a great deal of agreement amongst 
participants – and therefore an advanced level of coordination – that has to be found 
outside the market. This is necessary in order to counteract the strategies of the firms 
in their efforts to attain oligopolistic and even monopolistic positions: they manipu-
late prices or quality, establish reputations, or control norms. In this respect, the 
NLME are just as coordinated as the CME, but in a different manner. 
On the other hand, a review of the literature on the bases of institutional economic 
theories (Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997) shows that it is no longer possible to see the 
market as the sole process of coordination, no more than it is to view the market and 
the state as being diametrically opposed to one another. After all, depending on 
whether an action is motivated by one’s interest or by an obligation principle and as a 
function of the horizontal (or inversely, the asymmetrical) nature of the inter-actor 
distribution of power, we can define a myriad of modes of coordination. Excluding 
the intermediary forms represented by networks and associations, we end up with 
four polar principles (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 A taxonomy of the different coordination principles
 Mode of coordination and distribution of power
 Horizontal Vertical 
Interest 
1 Market 2 Firm 
Motive for action 
Obligation 3 Community, 
 Civil Society 
4 State 
Source: as per Hollingsworth /Boyer (1997). 
6 
Association 
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These four polar principles are 
– the market, supposedly an anonymous place for comparing a whole set of behav-
iours on the part of actors who are driven by their interests and endowed a priori 
with equal powers; 
– the company, or more generally the private hierarchy, which codifies coordina-
tion by wielding decisional power over actors who operate in line with their eco-
nomic interests; 
– the community and by extension the civil society, which is predicated upon an 
obligation principle and reputedly based upon horizontal relationships; 
– the state, which combines an obligation principle with coercive power. As such, 
it is diametrically opposed to the market, which is meant to organise voluntary 
relations between individuals acting on their own interests and imbued with 
equal powers. 
This taxonomy has some major effects. RT suggests that all institutional forms borrow 
from these four orders in proportions that will vary greatly from one social organisa-
tion to the other. Above all, RT provides the basis for a radical criticism of this polari-
sation of market capitalisms, depending on whether or not they are of the coordinated 
variety. The form of alternative coordination stressed in VOC can be the space that is 
controlled either by the firm (especially when it is a large conglomerate) or else by 
multiform state-orchestrated public interventions, not to mention the role that com-
munities and more generally civil society play in facilitating trade by building up trust. 
As much as anything else, this is a definition of the ideal types of capitalism, all of 
which are far from equivalent to one another. Private monopoly capitalism; central-
ised planning capitalism; networked capitalism – these are all emblematic figures with 
their own traits. We therefore need to abandon the reference to a single canonical 
opposition in order to determine the position that a particular economy holds in 
terms of these four major forms of coordination (the market, the firm, the state, and 
civil society). 
All in all, most modern VOC analyses of capitalism only cover one partial aspect of 
these coordination processes and should therefore not pretend to provide a general 
response (Figure 2). Economists cannot keep from asking which form of coordination 
is the best. In a world defined by the theory of general equilibrium and characterised 
by perfect information, an absence of strategic behaviour, public goods or external-
ities, and perfect forecasts (or in the absence thereof, by a complete set of future mar-
kets), the answer is simple – a market economy guarantees that corresponding equi-
libriums are Pareto-optimal. Yet real economies feature asymmetrical and imperfect 
information, strategic behaviours usually on the part of large actors, and significant 
public goods and externalities that can be either positive (education, innovation, 
healthcare) or negative (pollution, congestion, systemic risks) (Boyer 1997). 
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As for the NIE, which postulates that transaction cost minimisation is one property of 
these institutional arrangements, no sure response to the issue of capitalism’s institu-
tions has been given yet – despite the title of one of its seminal works (Williamson 
1985). NIE basically only deals with inter-market choices, vertical integration, and 
subcontracting; it scarcely focuses on issues like the state, norms, and civil society’s 
impact on the organisation of firms. NIE still wonders whether it is worth measuring 
variable transaction costs. They therefore remain unobserved, with the possible excep-
tion of their consequences (Ménard 2000). On this point, VOC and RT both criticise 
the partial and unsatisfactory tactic of basing an institutional economy on the sole 
principle of minimised transaction costs (Hall/Soskice 2000: 14–17). 
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Figure 2 Analysis of the varieties of capitalism, expressed as a combination 
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With this in mind, we can say that VOC approaches run a de facto risk of focusing on 
market logic as defined in standard microeconomic theory – and not the other coor-
dination processes that ex-market actors use. These processes should indeed be ana-
lysed but we have no general theory for them. Is the abovementioned coordination 
process based on community trust, on a firm’s coercive powers and incentives, or on 
the state’s ability to enforce its will by laws and regulations? Lacking any such analysis, 
there is a big risk that CME will only be seen as an imperfect form of NLME, by 
economists at least. This is far from the intent of researchers seeking a multidiscipli-
nary approach to capitalism’s institutions (Hall/Soskice 2001). Thus we prefer to 
stress that not all coordination processes have the same aims, nor are they applied in 
the same contexts. 
What has also become apparent is that each of the institutional arrangements ensur-
ing ex-market coordination has strengths as well as weaknesses. Both are activated but 
in varying order, depending on the context (Hollingsworth/Boyer 1997: 15–18). In a 
society marked by multiple orders and domains, how can we believe that one order 
will impose its logic on all the others? In other words, it is inherent to societies that 
they possess a plurality of institutional arrangements (Luhmann 1995). Better still, 
one institutional arrangement is usually the precondition for another – and its modus 
operandi will create imbalances or conflicts that in turn necessitate a third. Thus, the 
task of institutional economics is not to assess the real architectures it observes by 
referring to some mythical equilibrium in an entirely market-governed society – even 
if this were possible, it would contradict Karl Polanyi’s fundamental intuition (1944). 
Instead, what we should be explaining are the preconditions, strengths, and weak-
nesses of each configuration. Paradoxically, an institutional architecture is viable 
when each individually incomplete mechanism is adjusted by another partial one, 
with the quality of the whole being superior to that of its constituent parts (Delorme 
1999). 
The importance of labour market institutions and welfare systems 
This vision may seem theoretical but it is especially important for any explanation of 
the diversity of labour market institutions, a key component in the varieties of capital-
ism (Figure 3). The major dichotomies between liberal market economies and coor-
dinated market economies concern four components: the organisation of education 
and training, the nature of labour market institutions, the degree of financial inter-
mediation, and finally the stringency of competition policy. Clearly, LME basically 
rely on competition whereas CME try to combine extra-market cooperation with 
competition (see Table 4 above). 
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This juxtaposition is especially important for education and training. In the first con-
figuration, individuals invest mainly in general skills; in the second, the institutionali-
sation of competence formation justifies investing in sector- or firm-specific skills. 
Similarly, LME exhibit largely deregulated labour markets in which relative wages 
demonstrate a significant flexibility, whereas CME promote employee cooperation 
and collective agreements in wage formation. Somehow, labour market institutions 
complement, and symmetrically are complemented by, the financial regime and com-
petition policy in each of the two configurations. 
Within regulationist research, the concepts of skill–labour nexus and wage–labour 
nexus mirror the concepts of education and training systems and labour market insti-
tutions, whereas the monetary and financial regime is the equivalent of finance, and 
forms of competition are another name for competition policy in VOC. Thus, both 
theories stress the importance of labour market institutions. Nevertheless they end up 
with different configurations.  
RT clearly differentiates between the four brands of capitalism that result from com-
parative analyses. Within market-oriented economies, decentralisation and individu-
alisation strongly shape employment and wage formation. For meso-corporatist 
economies, a typical capital–labour compromise takes place at the level of the large 
firms, and wage hikes are synchronised across firms and sectors. Within state-led 
economies, one observes a strong institutionalisation of the rules governing hiring, 
firing, working hours, and even wages and social benefits. Finally, social democratic 
economies display a fourth configuration based upon a frequent and intensive view of 
collective bargaining at the national level (Table 4 above). 
Such a strong differentiation can be observed in almost any component of the wage–
labour nexus. One example would be the organisation of lifelong training. Neither a 
thoroughly free and unregulated market nor the state can provide, in and of itself, the 
basis for an efficient system, no more than an association or a community can. How-
ever, the combination can ensure a much more satisfactory dynamic than that which a 
pure system, governed by a single logic, could possibly deliver (Boyer 2001c).  
Figure 3 The institutions that shape firms’ organisation
Skill–labour nexus
Wage–labour nexus
Monetary and financial regime
Form of competition
Education and training
Labour market institutions
Finance
Competitive policy
Firm organisation
VOC RT
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Another example combining these contrasting coordination mechanisms and the ab-
sence of convergence towards a supposedly more efficient system is provided by mod-
ern social protection systems. People often think that the market has tended to replace 
the state, yet remarkably the NSPS have continued to manifest an extremely wide va-
riety of characteristics (Figure 4). Of course this diversity can be interpreted as a his-
torical legacy and a manifestation of path dependency (and the weight of history), for 
this is a hypothesis that is never irrelevant (Théret 2001). But it also demonstrates a 
certain complementarity between distinct logics and mechanisms, one that is not nec-
essarily going to disappear even if people’s discourses about (and representations of) 
‘good governance’ emphasise market mechanisms. These are already at work in the 
United States – but they have not delivered the expected results in terms of cost mod-
eration. Moreover they have had an unfavourable impact through their unequal ac-
cess to social protection. This is another example refuting the hypothesis that an om-
nipresent market is always the most efficient way of managing interdependencies. 
Offered privately,
run by the market
Organised and funded by the state
Figure 4 The various national social protection systems combine the four principles 
 differently
Focused on firms, 
offered by them
Focused on families and 
supplied by them
Sweden
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Soviet Union
Japan
Great Britain
United States
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Segment  indicates the extent of reliance on the market. 
Source: Adapted from Boyer (2000). 
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The endogenous evolution of each capitalism 
This highlights a third difference between VOC and RT, one involving the dynamics 
of change and the determinants thereof. The VOC approach gives the impression that 
national economies primarily change in order to react to external shocks and that the 
institutional infrastructure stays largely invariable. In a regulation approach, this cor-
responds to development in the regime, i.e., changes (within a stabilised mode of 
regulation) comprised of marginal innovations that do not undermine the institu-
tional forms’ own powers of stabilisation. In other words, for VOC, the 1990s basi-
cally involved a series of small shocks in countries like Japan or Germany, even if the 
magnitude of each shock (conveyed by the world economy and by finance) was 
greater than in preceding decades. So we should accept the idea that institutional ar-
chitecture possesses a basic invariability over the long run and should preserve its 
power to stabilise economic adjustments. 
For RT, on the other hand, the 1990s were a time of upheaval that can only be inter-
preted as a continuation of previous patterns. The crises in Germany and Japan were 
structural in nature – after all, short-term measures were unable to improve invest-
ment and growth dynamics. Another sign that the crises were a reflection of tempo-
rary economic factors was the fact that the 1990s were marked by the erosion of the 
driver institutions of German capitalism and subsequently of the Japanese miracle 
model (Boyer 2003). In other words, the crises were an outcome of earlier success. 
Past strengths were transformed into signs of weakness, especially since the changing 
international environment helped original modes of regulation (public in Germany, 
meso-corporatist in Japan) to emerge. The key question is whether the innovations, 
including the organisational and technological ones enabled by the institutional heri-
tage, were enough to restore the growth regime’s dynamic stability. This was clearly 
not true in Japan, which experienced a lost decade in the 1990s that was marked by 
stagnation, recurring deflationary phases, and alternating periods of lacklustre recov-
ery and temporary downswings (Boyer/Yamada 2000). 
This entices us to predict the threshold where a mode of regulation turns out to be 
unable to contain an accumulation process’s endogenous process and/or to respond 
to shocks coming from elsewhere (Figure 5). Various formalisations of this mecha-
nism in a closed economy have been proposed for the Fordist growth regime (Lordon 
1996, 1997; Billaudot 2002), but also for the financial markets’ modus operandi (Or-
léan 1992, 1999). In an open economy, other adjustment processes are at work, mobi-
lising increasingly high-level principles. The shocks may be of the same nature as the 
ones observed in the past and the growth regime may be in a emergence or maturity 
phase, but the mode of regulation’s interaction is what ensures this adjustment, by 
means of key variables that can be both internal and related to external relations. 
However, if cost, quality and innovation trends are no longer compatible with the 
competitiveness imperative, an economy’s adjustment will be ensured by the corre-
sponding country’s market share and by its growth rate. Clearly the German and 
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Japanese economies reached the adjustment process’s second stage in the 1990s. But 
there is also a third level where one or several institutional forms become mutually 
incompatible, leading to a reconfiguration of the mode of regulation. Now, actors 
(private or public) can draw from existing coordination procedures to try to get new 
institutional forms to emerge. This repertory is comprised of the constitutional order, 
the legal architecture, and the social norms and conventions that characterise (often 
over the long run) the society in which the economy is immersed. Here RT would 
conclude (unlike VOC) that the two countries we have been tracking have already 
entered into this second type of crisis. 
Using the USSR’s collapse as an example, we would find an entirely different form of 
crisis, one that is even more fundamental in nature: reformers, aware of the mode of 
development’s limitations, have successively tried out a series of reforms to relaunch 
the economic dynamic, without being able to find in their poor economic and politi-
cal environment the sources to renew such institutionalised compromises. RT calls 
such episodes major crises. The analytical power of this taxonomy is not just retro-
spective. Research has shown, for example, that the liberalisation, openness, and fi-
nancialisation strategies enacted in Argentina had limitations the country could not 
help but encounter, given the pegging of the country’s currency to the dollar (Quémia 
2001). 
There are major differences in the ways RT or VOC characterise comparisons of the 
main OECD countries. For reasons of strategy presentation methods and strategies, 
VOC stresses the permanency of CME performance. RT wonders why most of these 
economies (be they governed by a public or a meso-corporatist mode of regulation) 
run up against their limitations. 
Follower 
countries
Figure 5 The different levels of adjustment for a mode of regulation in an open economy
Leader 
country
Repertory of 
coordination
procedures
Technological trajectory
Institutional forms and 
mode of regulation
Specialisation
Technological trajectory
1 Stability: Homeostatic equilibrium
2 Revision of market share
3 Adjustment of institutional forms
4 Structural crisis: need to revise repertory
Institutional forms and 
mode of regulation
Repertory of 
coordination
procedures
4 3 4
12
1
Boyer: How and Why Capitalisms Differ 31 
From institutional forms to productive model 
Can these developments be used to inspire a new generation of institutionalist studies? 
In actual fact today’s VOC proponents, specifically Hall/Soskice (2001), invite regula-
tionist searchers to explore new or shared themes and above all to develop a theory of 
the firm, because they think that  
… relevant actors can be individuals, firms, groups of producers or governments. In any 
event, this political economy focuses on the firm, and considers companies to be decisive ac-
tors in a capitalist economy. (Hall /Soskice 2001: 6) 
Another question concerns the relations between the political and economic spheres: 
how can the trajectories of the two approaches be reconciled? Amongst the most 
common themes is the question of institutional complementarity, which can be broa-
ched by various methodologies whose respective merits should be listed. Lastly, we 
hardly dare to raise the great unresolved question of social sciences: how can the mi-
cro- and macroeconomic levels of the analysis be linked?  
Towards an institutionalist theory of the firm 
This focus on the firm is one of the specificities that modern VOC claims.  
We apply a set of concepts commonly used to explain behaviour at the micro level of the 
economy to problems of understanding the macroeconomy … Markets and hierarchies are 
features of neo-liberal and coordinated market economies but we stress the systemic variation 
found in the character of corporate structure (or hierarchies) across different types of econo-
mies and the presence of coordination problems even within hierarchical settings. 
(Hall /Soskice 2001: 14) 
Of course, for almost a decade now RT has been looking for the right way to analyse 
the firm. Should we start with evolutionists’ conception and stress the role of routines 
and how competitors choose them (Coriat/Dosi 2002) or should we follow the insti-
tutionalist approaches, based on transaction costs, for example Coriat/Weinstein 
(1995)? VOC authors propose another starting point, which is nothing other than the 
theory of supermodularity applied to company management systems (Milgrom/Rob-
erts 1990). 
Actually, these propositions mesh with a number of recent RT-inspired studies. The 
same applies to GERPISA (Group for the Study and Permanent Research of the Auto-
mobile Industry and Its Employees) research into productive models, wherein produc-
tive organisation is presented in a way (Figure 6) that is relatively similar to Hall and  
 
32 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /4 
Soskice, with firms bathing in a coordinated (p. 28) or neo-liberal (p. 32) market eco-
nomic environment. At least three convergences can be found between these two ap-
proaches: 
– An environment is more than a price system since the institutional forms gov-
erning the financial sphere, competition, and the wage–labour nexus concen-
trate and codify information relevant to firms (Aoki 2001) and inform organisa-
tional choices. The impact of institutional forms can be added up, depending 
how the growth mode and income distribution are described. 
– Profit strategy relevancy mostly depends on institutional and macroeconomic 
factors, conveyed by the uncertainty and the changes that firms encounter in 
their product policy and productive organisation, plus the way they structure 
their employment relationship – this being how an overall wage–labour nexus 
breaks down at the firm level (Billaudot 1996).  
– Lastly, the medium-term viability of a firm infers something akin to a govern-
ance compromise that allows for a permanent adjustment of management to 
signals from environment and to the requirements of the chosen profit strategy. 
Thus, a firm fits into a network of interdependencies with its general institutional 
environment – this being exactly the key message that VOC conveys. 
Figure 6 The productive model concept as a starting point for an institutionalist analysis 
 of the firm
International regime
Mode of growth
and income distribution
Profit strategy
Source: adapted from Boyer/Freyssenet (2000: 24).
Product policy
Corporate Governance 
compromise
Employment
relationship
Product
organisation
Competition/productFinance Labour
Boyer: How and Why Capitalisms Differ 33 
We believe it would be unrealistic to consider that the economy’s overall institutional archi-
tecture and especially actors’ coordination mechanisms (i.e., markets, institutional networks, 
collective organisations1) are constructs created and controlled by a given firm. … In sum, 
and in many respects, strategy derives from structure. (Hall /Soskice 2001: 15) 
As a result, the possibility that the two approaches agree on the theory of the firm is 
less farfetched than it first seems when the authors affirm that their work is based on a 
new economic theory of organisation and that they are trying to develop an economic 
policy that is appropriate for market economies. Firms’ organisational choices are 
actually informed and constrained by the overall institutional architecture, not the 
other way around. Formalisations respectively undertaken within RT (Amable et al. 
2002) and VOC (Mares 2001) effectively use characteristics drawn from the external 
environment (be it the importance of market-based funding for firms or the nature of 
social protection) as data to deduce the organisational systems on offer for firms bath-
ing in an environment they do not individually have the power to alter. Thus, the re-
search programmes of the two approaches converge. 
Organisational and institutional complementarities and isomorphism 
If we were to accept Peter Hall and David Soskice’s outlook per se, we would have to 
agree that they extend the supermodularity theory of firm organisation to capitalism’s 
institutions. Now, this may be an acceptable approach, since – contrary to the naive 
conception of benchmarking wherein each contribution is strictly additive (so that it 
is easy to move from ‘one best way’ to the next) – theory does prove that contrasting 
management mechanism configurations can coexist. In fact, each of these diametri-
cally opposed configurations of company organisation is capable of turning into 
whole array of specific economic institutions. 
For example, the just-in-time and total quality model presupposes an industrial dis-
trict type of organisation to satisfy time constraints on the delivery of components, the 
need for a polyvalent workforce (so as to move easily from the production of one 
good to another) and industrial relations that are sufficiently pacified to stave off any 
                                                        
1  This succession of coordination mechanisms, all of which differ from one another and consti-
tute alternatives to the market, suggests that the authors have finally agreed with RT and in 
particular with the taxonomy deployed in figures 1 to 3. Once again, this substantiates the new 
idea that it is for reasons of audience receptiveness to their analyses in the English-speaking 
world that Peter Hall and David Soskice have adopted the binary opposition between NLME 
and CME. Furthermore, the real opposition is between the German and US economies, as 
shown by the succession of empirical references in their texts (figures 3 and 4; figures 5 and 6). 
As such, this opposition runs contrary to the rest of their empirical data, which covers a wider 
sample of OECD countries (tables 1 and 2; figures 1 and 2) (Hall /Soskice 2001). 
34 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /4 
strike threat, which should be limited to a very small workgroup and not block the 
entire value chain. 
Hence it is theoretically possible to generate varieties of capitalism based on a combi-
nation of two hypotheses: a technological or organisational type of complementarity 
between work, equipment, and product; versus an isomorphism between companies’ 
organisation and global economic institutions. In terms of what our authors write, we 
could formulate the following equation: 
Hall /Soskice (2001) = Milgrom/Roberts (1990) + DiMaggio/Powell (1991) 
or in more theoretical terms: 
VOC = theory of supermodularity + isomorphism between organisation and institution. 
Once again a careful examination of the reasoning and clarity of Hall and Soskice’s 
figures 3 and 4 (2001: 28, 32) demonstrates that the complementarities relate to global 
institutions, which, in turn, shape, constrain, or provoke appropriate management 
mechanisms and routines within firms. The causality is clearly expressed: it goes from 
the macro- to the microeconomic, even if the overall dynamic is never more than the 
result of a conjunction of the development of different firms. And yet, there is abso-
lutely no reason to select these macroeconomic properties as an expression of the con-
straints that the representative firms face. 
Thus the distance between VOC’s reality and results and RT’s orientation is finally 
reduced. Figuratively, we could postulate a second equation that is representative of 
the latest RT developments, but, in a sense, of VOC as well: 
RT microeconomics =  
institutional complementarity + isomorphism between institutions and organisations. 
This paves the way for a vast but difficult field of research, where we would examine 
the extent to which these two concepts constitute alternatives (Figure 7) or, inversely, 
can be combined in practice, if only because technology, companies’ organisation, 
and economic institutions all co-develop over the long run. Of course, this is not the 
only work to be done. 
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Heterogeneous firms within a clear institutional architecture  
This polarisation fits one of major lessons derived from evolutionist approaches (Dosi 
2002). Moreover, formalisations of the evolutionist model suggest that macroeco-
nomic patterns are the emerging properties of selection and learning mechanisms, 
without any correspondence to the trajectories of the firms that comprise them (Dosi 
et al. 1993). In other models it appears that heterogeneity between the technologies 
being implemented, the products on offer, and companies’ forms of organisation is a 
precondition for the corresponding economy’s long-term stability (Eliasson 1984, 
1998). However, both VOC and RT suffer from a major deficiency, which is that they 
assume (at least implicitly) that one single form of organisation prevails within a given 
Figure 7 Links between organisational complementarity, organisational/institutional  
 isomorphism and institutional complementarity
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capitalism. This hypothesis is refuted in the case of the United States, if only because 
information technology has given birth to an organisational model in Silicon Valley 
that is quite different from the vertically integrated firm that had been so characteris-
tic of the United States during its era of strong growth. Thus the Silicon Valley 
firm (SV) coexists with the modernisation of firm A, not to mention that certain 
American multinationals belong to yet another category, that of global firm G 
(Aoki 2001). The homogeneity hypothesis is just as refuted for Germany, inas-
much as organisational models can vary greatly from one region, sector, or mar-
ketplace to the next. 
This is one of the major findings (and a surprising one at that, given regulation 
theory’s initial conception of the firm) of GERPISA’s comparative studies, which 
have proven the coexistence of contrasting organisational models within every 
country and within a given sector (automobile). Ultimately this has led to an in-
teresting interpretation: within a given institutional architecture, the markets and 
the division of labour’s development and sophistication have created room for a 
wide array of profit strategies, each endowed with a competitive advantage and 
seeking to exploit other strategies’ weaknesses, without any one being able to con-
quer the whole market. Moreover, the distribution of corresponding organisa-
tional models has varied over time as the institutional environment has changed 
(Figure 8). 
The challenge facing institutionalist theories is a considerable one – how to preserve 
hypotheses of institutional complementarity and isomorphism between firms’ organi-
sations and institutional architectures while abandoning the postulate of an emblem-
atic firm, one that has been clearly rejected by observing the modern distribution of 
firms (and in a succession of industrial surveys). Still, awareness of the complexity of 
an approach that is supposed to highlight the macroinstitutional foundations of a 
microeconomy injects a great deal of relevancy into institutional and historical mac-
roeconomics, since the only thing we could hope from a unique analytical model 
would be for it to deal satisfactorily with both the macro- and microlevels.  
As such, it wouldn’t be at all absurd for us to continue to explore the reasons why 
varieties of capitalism exist that are based on something more than a mere diversity of 
technological and organisational complementarities at the firm level. This could be an 
ideal project to enhance cooperation between researchers who see themselves as be-
longing either to VOC or to RT – as long as each side is aware of the similarities be-
tween their respective research orientations. 
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Figure 8 From the mode of regulation to the heterogeneous nature of firms: three steps
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Conclusion 
We can summarise the previous developments in the five following propositions. 
The bulk of comparative institutional analyses does conclude that contemporary capi-
talisms significantly differ in terms of their basic institutional forms as well as their 
various organisations at the firm level. It is especially so for labour market institu-
tions, welfare financing, and organisation; yet we should also not forget just how idio-
syncratic the relations are between state and economy in developed as well as develop-
ing countries. 
1. In addition to much empirical evidence, numerous theoretical reasons may ex-
plain the diversity of capitalist configurations. Generally, most if not all institu-
tional forms are the outcome of social and political conflicts that are embedded 
in a specific society for a given historical period. The basic institutions that gov-
ern a capitalist economy usually combine a significant variety of coordinating 
mechanisms: on top of the conventional opposition between state and market, 
actors such as communities, networks, associations, and private organisations 
play a role in building economic institutions. Once created, these institutions 
exhibit large sunk costs and thus display increasing returns. This is an explana-
tion for a specific form of path dependency. Lastly, evolutionary theories suggest 
that technologies, institutions, and organisations co-evolve. Thus, there is no 
clear force that would bring about the convergence of various capitalisms. 
2. This institutional diversity shows up in a variety of ‘regulation modes’ and ac-
cumulation regimes that differ across time and space. For instance, during the 
Golden Age of rapid growth in most OECD countries, the Fordist regime was 
not a general feature at all, since, for instance, social democratic countries ex-
perienced an export-led growth based on differentiation by quality and innova-
tion. Therefore, contrasted growth regimes were the result of the institutional 
competitive advantage of each domestic space. In the 1990s, the finance-led 
growth regime was basically restricted to the United States and, to a minor ex-
tent, to the United Kingdom, since most other OECD countries continue to ex-
perience a transformation of their previous growth regimes. 
3. This diversity of capitalism is not restricted to the dichotomy between liberal 
market economies, such as the U.S. one, and coordinated market economies, of 
which Germany is a clear example. Within OECD countries, at least four brands 
of capitalism can be diagnosed. This spectrum is still widening with the trans-
formation of former Soviet-type economies in Eastern Europe and in China. 
Furthermore, the newly industrialising countries, especially in Asia, are probably 
enlarging the repertoire of capitalist forms. A lot of research has still to be done 
in order to build a fully-fledged theory of the evolution and the diversity of capi-
talism. 
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4. Lastly, the diversity of institutions and forms of organisation is often interpreted 
as stemming from delayed adjustment, social or political inertia, or dependency 
on one’s historical legacy. The present analysis stresses that each institutional 
and organisational configuration develops its own adaptation and innovation 
capabilities, meaning that it would be inaccurate to oppose the dynamism of cer-
tain forms with the archaism and immobility of others. Trying to ascertain the 
margins of development and flexibility of a particular type of capitalism and the 
mutatis mutandis of a kind of productive model thus constitutes another prom-
ising research objective. 
 
40 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /4 
References 
Aglietta, Michel, 1976: Régulation et crises du capitalisme. Paris: Calman-Lévy. 
        , 1986: Etats-Unis: persévérance dans l’être ou renouveau de la croissance. In: Robert Boyer 
(ed.), Capitalismes fin de siècle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 33–66. 
Aglietta, Michel /Nadine Mendelek, 1987: Politiques économiques nationales et évolution du sys-
tème monétaire européen. In: Economie et prospective internationale 32(4), 43–76. 
Amable, Bruno, 1999: Institutional Complementarity and Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation 
and Production. Discussion Paper FS I 99-309. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozial-
forschung. 
        , 2002: Régulation Theory and Technical Change. In: Robert Boyer/Yves Saillard (eds.), Régu-
lation Theory: The State of the Art. London: Routledge, 168–173. 
        , 2004: The Diversity of Modern Capitalisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Amable, Bruno/Rémi Barré/Robert Boyer, 1997: Les systèmes d’innovation à l’ère de la globalisa-
tion. Paris: Economica. 
Amable, Bruno/Pascal Petit, 2001: The Diversity of Social Systems of Innovation and Production 
during the 1990s. CEPREMAP Working Paper (Couverture Orange) 0115. Paris: CEPREMAP. 
Amable, Bruno/Ekkehard Ernst /Stefano Palombarini, 2001: Institutional Complementarities: An 
Overview of the Main Issues. Conference Paper. Seminar on Institutional Complementarities 
and Dynamics of Economic Systems, Paris, 5–6 April 2001. 
        , 2002: Comment les marchés financiers peuvent-ils affecter les relations industrielles? Une 
approche par la complémentarité institutionnelle. In: L’année de la régulation 6, 271–288. 
André, Christine, 1997: L’état social en Europe depuis vingt ans: plutôt un pragmatisme orienté selon 
des idées néolibérales et encadré par les configurations nationales que de grandes réformes. Un-
published document. Paris: CEPREMAP. 
André, Christine/Delorme Robert, 1989: Analyse comparée des interventions publiques en économie 
entre la France et la République Fédérale d’Allemagne. Unpublished document. Paris: CEPRE-
MAP. 
Aoki, Masahiko, 2001: Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Arthur, Brian, 1994: Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press. 
Barou, Yves/Bernard Keizer, 1984: Les grandes économies. Paris: Editions du Seuil. 
Baslé, Maurice/Jacques Mazier/Jean-François Vidal, 1984: Quand les crises durent. Paris: Econo- 
mica. 
Bénassy, Jean-Pascal/Robert Boyer/Rosa-Maria Gelpi, 1979: Régulation des économies capitalistes 
et inflation. In: Revue économique 30(3), 397–441. 
Berger, Suzane/Ronald Dore (eds.), 1996: National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Bertrand, Hugues, 1983: Accumulation, régulation, crise: un modèle sectionnel théorique et appli-
qué. In: Revue économique 34(6), 305–343. 
Billaudot, Bernard, 1996: L’ordre économique de la société moderne. Paris: Editions L’Harmattan. 
        , 2001: Régulation et croissance: une macroéconomie historique et institutionnelle. Paris: Editions 
L’Harmattan. 
        , 2002: Institutional Forms and Macroeconomics [and] Short- and Medium-Term Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics. In: Robert Boyer/Yves Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: The State of the 
Art. London: Routledge, 139–143 and 144–152.  
Bowles, Samuel/Robert Boyer, 1990: A Wage-led Employment Regime: Income Distribution, La-
bour Discipline and Aggregate Demand in Welfare Capitalism. In: Steve Marglin/Juliet Schor 
(eds.), The Golden Age of Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 187–217. 
Boyer, Robert (ed.), 1986a: Capitalismes fin de siècle. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
        , 1986b: La flexibilité du travail en Europe. Paris: La Découverte. 
Boyer: How and Why Capitalisms Differ 41 
Boyer, Robert, 1988: Formalizing Growth Regimes. In: Giovanni Dosi et al. (eds.), Technical 
Change and Economic Theory. London: Pinter. 
        , 1991: Capital Labor Relation and Wages Formation: Continuities and Changes of National 
Trajectories Among OECD Countries. In: Toshiyuki Mizoguchi (ed.), Making Economies, 
More Efficient and More Equitable: Factors Determining Income Distribution. Tokyo: Kino-
kunya, 297–340. 
        , 1993: D’une série de ‘National Labour Standards’ à un ‘European Monetary Standard’? In: 
Recherches économiques de Louvain 59(1/2), 119–153. 
        , 1994: Do Labour Institutions Matter for Economic Development? A Regulation Approach 
for the OECD and Latin America with an Extension to Asia. In: Gerry Rodgers (ed.), Workers, 
Institutions and Economic Growth in Asia. Geneva: ILO/ILLS, 25–112. 
        , 1995: Capital–labour Relations in OECD Countries: From the Fordist Golden Age to Con-
trasted National Trajectories. In: Juliet Schor/Jong-Il You (eds.), Capital, the State and La-
bour: A Global Perspective. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 18–69. 
        , 1996: The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of Nations? 
In: Suzanne Berger/Ronald Dore (eds.), National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 29-59. 
        , 1997: The Variety of Unequal Performance of Really Existing Markets: Farewell to Doctor 
Pangloss? In: Rogers J. Hollingsworth/Robert Boyer (eds.), Contemporary Capitalism: The 
Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55–93. 
        , 1999: The Variety and Dynamics of Capitalism. In: John Groenewegen/Jack Vromen (eds.), 
Institutions and the Evolution of Capitalism: Implications of Evolutionary Economics. North-
ampton: Edward Elgar, 122–140. 
        , 2000: The French Welfare: An Institutional and Historical Analysis in European Perspective. 
CEPREMAP Working Paper (Couverture  Orange) No. 0007. Paris: CEPREMAP. 
        , 2001a: La diversité des institutions d’une croissance tirée par l’information ou la connais-
sance. In: Centre Saint-Gobain pour la Recherche en Économie (ed.), Institutions et croissance. 
Paris: Albin Michel, 327–398. 
        , 2001b: L’après consensus de Washington: institutionnaliste et systémique? In: L’année de la 
régulation 5, 13–56. 
        , 2001c: Promoting Learning in the Enterprise: The Lessons from International Comparisons 
in the Light of Economic Theory. Conference paper. International Conference on Adult 
Learning Policies, Co-organized by OECD and the Krivet, Seoul, Korea, 5–7 December 2001. 
        , 2002: From Canonical Fordism to Different Modes of Development. In: Robert Boyer/Yves 
Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: The State of the Art. London: Routledge, 231–237. 
        , 2003: The Embedded Innovation Systems of Germany and Japan: Distinctive Features and 
Futures. In: Kozo Yamamura/Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), The End of Diversity? Prospects for 
German and Japanese Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 147–182. 
        , 2004a, The Future of Growth. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
        , 2004b, New Growth Regimes, But Still Institutional Diversity. In: Socio-Economic Review 2 
(1), 1–32.  
Boyer, Robert/Jean-Pierre Durand, 1993: L’Après-Fordisme. Paris: Syros. 
Boyer, Robert, et al. (eds.), 1998: Between Imitation and Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Boyer, Robert/Michel Freyssenet, 2002: The Productive Models. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Boyer, Robert/Michel Juillard, 2002: United States: Goodbye, Fordism! In: Robert Boyer/Yves 
Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: The State of the Art. London: Routledge, 238–246. 
Boyer, Robert/André Orlean, 1991: Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et 
histoire. In: Revue économique 2, 233–272. 
Boyer, Robert/Toshio Yamada (eds.), 2000: Japanese Capitalism in Crisis. London: Routledge. 
Boyer, Robert/Yves Saillard (eds.), 2002: Régulation Theory: The State of the Art. London: Rout-
ledge. 
42 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /4 
Cepremap-Cordes, 1977: Approches de l’inflation: l’exemple français. (Authors: J. Benassy, R. Boyer, 
R.-M. Gelpi, A. Lipietz, J. Mistral, J. Munoz,  C. Ominami.) Rapport de la convention de re-
cherche 22/176. Paris: CEPREMAP. 
        , 1978: Approches de l’inflation: l’exemple français. Recherches Economiques et Sociales 12. 
Paris: La Documentation française. 
Coriat, Benjamin, 2002: France: The End of Fordism … and No Successor in Sight. In: Robert 
Boyer/Yves Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: The State of the Art. London: Routledge, 247–
253. 
Coriat, Benjamin/Joao Saboia, 1987: Régime d’accumulation et rapport salarial au Brésil (des années 
1950 aux années 1980) – Un processus de fordisation forcée et contrariée. GERTTD 87-01, Paris, 
janvier. 
Coriat, Benjamin/Olivier Weinstein, 1995: Les nouvelles théories de l’entreprise. Paris: Le Livre de 
Poche. 
Coriat, Benjamin/Giovanni Dosi, 2002: Evolution and Regulationary Theories: Similarities and 
Differences. In: Robert Boyer/Yves Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: The State of the Art. 
London: Routledge, 306–311. 
De Bernis, Gérard, 1977: Régulation et équilibre dans l’analyse économique. In: André Lichnero-
wicz/François Perroux/Gilbert Gadoffre (eds.), L’idée de régulation dans les sciences. Paris: 
Maloine. 
Delorme, Robert, 1999: De l’emprise à l’en-prise. Agir en situation complexe. In: GRASCE (co-
ord.), Entre systémique et complexité, chemin faisant. Mélanges en l’honneur de J.-L. Le Moigne. 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 25–46. 
Delorme, Robert /Christine André, 1983: L’État et l’économie. Un essai d’explication de l’évolution 
des dépenses publiques en France 1870–1980. Paris: Editions du Seuil. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. /Walter Powell (eds.), 1991: The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Dosi, Giovanni (ed.), 2002: Innovation, Organization and Economic Dynamics. Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar. 
Dosi, Giovanni, et al., 1993: On the Process of Economic Development. CCC Working Paper 93-2. 
University of California at Berkeley. 
Durand, Jean-Pierre/Juan-José Castillo/Paul Stewart (eds.), 1998: Teamwork in the Automobile 
Industry. Radical Change or Passing Fashion? Hampshire: MacMillan. 
Eliasson, Gunnar, 1984: Micro Heterogeneity of Firms and the Stability of Industrial Growth. In: 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 5(3–4), 249–274. 
        , 1998: On the Micro Foundations of Economic Growth: Human Capital, Firms Organization 
and Competitive Selection. In: Jacques Lesourne/André Orléan (eds.), Advances in Self-
Organization and Evolutionary Economics. London: Economica, 287–307. 
Ernst, Ekkehard, 2001: Complémentarités institutionnelles et croissance économique à long terme. 
Paris: Thèse EHESS. 
Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 1990: The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
Freyssenet, Michel, et al., 1998: One Best Way? Trajectories and Industrial Models of the World’s 
Automobile Producers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gatti, Donatella, 2000: Formes d’organisation changement technique et emploi. Doctoral thesis. Paris: 
EHESS. 
Gourevitch, Peter/Michael Hawes, 2001: Understanding National Production Systems: Comparative 
Capitalism in the Globalized Economy. Conference paper. Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, University of California at San Diego, 30 August–2 September 
2001. 
Hall, Peter/David Soskice (eds.), 2001: Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boyer: How and Why Capitalisms Differ 43 
Hall, Peter/Daniel W. Gingerich, 2002: Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities 
in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis. Conference paper. International Seminar on In-
stitutional Complementarities and Dynamics of Economic Systems, Paris, 5–6 April 2002. 
Hollingsworth, Rogers J. /Robert Boyer (eds.), 1997: Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness 
of Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Inoué, Yasuo/Toshio Yamada, 2002: Japan: Demythologising Regulation. In: Robert Boyer/Yves 
Saillard (eds.), Régulation Theory: The State of the Art. London: Routledge, 260–266. 
Iversen, Torben/David Soskice, 2000: The Non-neutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Prince or 
Wage Setters. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(1), 265–284. 
Jenson, Jane, 1990: Representations in Crisis. The Roots of Canada’s Permeable Fordism. In: Ca-
nadian Journal of Political Science 24(2), 653–683. 
Kogut, Bruce/John Paul MacDuffie/Charles Ragin, 2002: Prototypes and Fuzzy Work Practices: 
Assigning Causal Credit for Performance. Conference paper. International Seminar on Institu-
tional Complementarities and Dynamics of Economic Systems, Paris, 5–6 April 2002. 
Leithausser, Gerhard, 1986: Crise malgré la flexibilité: le cas de l’Allemagne de l’Ouest. In: Robert 
Boyer (ed.), La flexibilité du travail en Europe. Paris: La Découverte, 171–188. 
Lipietz, Alain, 1985: Mirages et miracles. Problèmes de l’industrialisation dans le Tiers-Monde. Paris: 
La Découverte. 
Lordon, Frédéric, 1996: Cycle et chaos dans un modèle hétérodoxe de croissance endogène. In: 
Revue économique 46(6), 1405–1432. 
        , 1997: Endogeneous Structural Change and Crisis in a Multiple Time-Scales Growth Model. 
In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics 7(1), 1–21. 
Luhmann, Niklas, 1995: Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Lung, Yannick, et al. (eds.), 1999: Coping with Variety. Flexible Productive Systems for Product Vari-
ety in the Auto Industry. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Mares, Isabela, 2001: Firms and the Welfare State: When, Why, and How Does Social Policy Matter 
to Employers? In: Peter Hall /David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 184–212. 
Marques-Pereira, Jaime/Bruno Théret, 2001: Régimes politiques, médiations sociales de la régula-
tion et dynamiques macroéconomiques. In: L’année de la régulation 5, 105–144. 
Marx, Karl, 1971: A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
Ménard, Claude (ed.), 2000: Institutions, Contracts and Organizations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Milgrom, Paul/John Roberts, 1990: The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strat-
egy, and Organization. In: American Economic Review 80(3), 511–528. 
OECD, 2001: Towards a Knowledge-based Economy. OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Scoreboard. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Ominami, Carlos, 1986: Le tiers monde dans la crise: essai sur la transformation récente des rapports 
Nord-Sud. Paris: La Découverte. 
Orléan, André, 1992: Contagion des opinions et fonctionnement des marchés financiers. In: Revue 
économique 43(4), 685–697. 
        , 1999: Le pouvoir de la finance. Paris: Odile Jacob. 
Palombarini, Stefano, 2001: La rupture du compromis social italien: un essai de macroéconomie 
politique. Paris: Editions du CNRS. 
Polanyi, Karl, 1944: The Great Transformation (later published: Boston: Beacon, 1957). 
Quémia, Miguel, 2001: Théorie de la régulation et développement: trajectoires latino-américaines. 
In: L’année de la régulation 5, 57–104. 
Stiglitz, Joseph, 1987: Dependence of Quality on Price. In: Journal of Economic Literature 25, 1–48. 
Tcheprakov, Victor, 1969: Le capitalisme monopoliste d’État. Moscow: Les Éditions du Progrès. 
Théret, Bruno, 1992: Régimes économiques de l’ordre politique: esquisse d’une théorie régulationniste 
des limites de l’État. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
        , 1997: Méthodologie des comparaisons internationales, approches de l’effet sociétal et de la 
régulation: fondements pour une lecture structuraliste des systèmes nationaux de protection 
sociale. In: L’année de la régulation 1, 163– 228. 
44 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /4 
        , 2001: Changes in the French Social Protection System: Path Dependencies, Timing, and Interna-
tional Challenges. Conference paper. Third Conference of the European Union COST A15 
Program Reforming Social Protection Systems in Europe: Comparing Dynamics of Transfor-
mation of Social Protection Systems in the Context of Globalisation and European Construc-
tion. Session: The Linkages between Globalisation, European Integration and Social Protec-
tion Systems Changes, Berlin, 26–27 April 2001. 
Ward, Terry, 1986: De la montée des tensions à la confrontation ouverte: le cas du Royaume-Uni. 
In: Robert Boyer (ed.), La flexibilité du travail en Europe. Paris: La Découverte, 58–80. 
White, Harrison C., 1981: Where Do Markets Come From? In: American Journal of Sociology 87(3), 
517–547. 
        , 1988: Varieties of Markets. In: Barry Wellman/Steven Berkowitz (eds.), Social Structures: A 
Network Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 226–260.  
Williamson, Oliver, 1985: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press. 
Wolleb, Enrico, 1986: L’industrialisation tardive: le cas de l’Italie. In: Robert Boyer (ed.), La flexi-
bilité du travail en Europe. Paris: La Découverte, 140–170. 
Yamada, Toshio, 1992: Heurs et malheurs du mode de régulation japonais. In: Mondes en dévelop-
pement 79/80, 159–166. 
 
 

 Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG 
MPIfG Discussion Papers 
DP 05/6 
J. Beckert 
The Moral Embeddedness of 
Markets 
DP 05 /5 
S. Ganghof 
High Taxes in Hard Times 
How Denmark Built and 
Maintained a Huge Income Tax 
DP 05 /4 
R. Boyer 
How and Why Capitalisms 
Differ 
DP 05 /3 
A. Trif 
Explaining Diversity in 
Industrial Relations at 
Company Level in Eastern 
Europe: Evidence from 
Romania 
DP 05 /2 
B. Ebbinghaus  
Can Path Dependence Explain 
Institutional Change? Two 
Approaches Applied to 
Welfare State Reform 
DP 05 /1 
C. Woll  
Learning to Act on World 
Trade: Preference Formation of 
Large Firms in the United 
States and the European Union 
MPIfG Working Papers 
WP 05 /4 
W. Streeck 
Nach dem Korporatismus: 
Neue Eliten, neue Konflikte 
WP 05 /3 
C. Trampusch  
Sequenzorientierte Policy-
Analyse: Warum die 
Rentenreform von Walter 
Riester nicht an 
Reformblockaden scheiterte 
WP 05 /2 
W. Streeck, C. Trampusch 
Economic Reform and the 
Political Economy of the 
German Welfare State 
WP 05 /1 
R. Mayntz, F.W. Scharpf 
Politische Steuerung – Heute? 
WP 04 /6 
F.W. Scharpf  
Legitimationskonzepte jenseits 
des Nationalstaats 
WP 04 /5 
A. Schäfer 
A New Form of Governance? 
Comparing the Open Method 
of Coordination to Multilateral 
Surveillance by the IMF and 
the OECD 
WP 04 /4 
W. Streeck 
Globalisierung: Mythos und 
Wirklichkeit 
MPIfG Books 
L. Krempel 
Visualisierung komplexer 
Strukturen: Grundlagen  
der Darstellung mehr- 
dimensionaler Netzwerke 
Campus, 2005 
S. Leiber 
Europäische Sozialpolitik und 
nationale Sozialpartnerschaft 
Campus, 2005 
S. Ganghof, P. Manow (Hg.) 
Mechanismen der Politik: 
Strategische Interaktion im 
deutschen Regierungssystem 
Campus, 2005 
M. Hartlapp 
Die Kontrolle der nationalen 
Rechtsdurchsetzung durch die 
Europäische Kommission 
Campus, 2005 
A. Sorge 
The Global and the Local: 
Understanding the Dialectics 
of Business Systems 
Oxford University Press, 2005 
W. Streeck, K. Thelen (eds.) 
Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies 
Oxford University Press, 2005 
J. Beckert 
Unverdientes Vermögen: 
Soziologie des Erbrechts 
Campus, 2004 
 
 
 
 
Ordering Information 
MPIfG Discussion Papers  
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG web-
site (free). 
MPIfG Working Papers  
Online at the MPIfG website. 
MPIfG Books  
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website. 
www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de 
Go to Publications. 
New Titles 
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for news-
letters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpifg.de, we 
will be happy to send you our Recent Publications 
brochure. 
ERPA 
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa. 
 
